Private browsing has been a popular privacy feature built into all mainstream browsers since 2005. However, despite the prevalent use, the security of this feature has received little attention from the research community. To the best of our knowledge, no study has existed that systematically evaluates the security of private browsing across all major browsers and from all angles: not only examining the memory, but also the underlying database structure on the disk and the web traffic. In this paper, we present an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of private browsing across the four most popular web browsers: IE, Firefox, Chrome and Safari. We report that all browsers under study suffer from a variety of vulnerabilities, many of which have not been reported or known before. The problems are generally caused by the following factors: a lax control of permission to allow extensions to run in the private mode with unrestricted privilege; inconsistent implementations of the underlying SQLite database between the private and usual modes; the neglect of the cross-mode interference when the two modes are run in parallel; a lack of attention to side-channel timing attacks, etc. All of the attacks have been experimentally verified with countermeasures proposed. 
Introduction
In 2005, Safari first introduced private browsing, a feature that enables a user to surf the Internet without leaving traces on her local computer, such as history, cookies and temporary files [1] . Since then, all other mainstream browsers have added the same feature, including Internet Explorer (IE) [18] , Chrome [15] and Firefox [16] .
Although the basic aim of private browsing is the same, the implementations vary greatly across different browsers. This adds significant complexity to the subject. In USENIX Security'10, Aggarwal, Burzstein, Jackson and Boneh first initiated the study of the security of private browsing in modern browsers and discovered several vulnerabilities [1] . In particular, they studied the dire impact of browser extensions on private browsing in Firefox (v3.6). A year later, Said et al. continued the study of private browsing [14] . They focused on examining the content in the volatile memory and found that artifacts from the private session remained in memory even after the session had been closed. Recently, in ESORICS'13, Lerner et al. presented a software tool that allows automatic verification of the browser extensions' compliance with the private mode [8] . The tool was mainly tested on Firefox extensions, although in principle it could be easily extended to other browsers.
Apart from these three papers, the security of private browsing seems to have been almost entirely neglected by the security research community. To date, no study has existed that systematically analyses the security of private browsing across all major web browsers and from all angles: not just examining the memory, but also the underlying database structure on the disk and web traffic.
We believe this lack of attention is disproportionate to the importance of the subject. Over the past five years since 2008, private browsing has been extensively used by a significant portion of Internet users (19% according to a survey [1] ) to protect their privacy during web navigation [8] . Given the prevalent use of private browsing and the fact that many users are relying on it for privacy, it is important to ensure that private browsing is really as "private" as the browser vendors have claimed.
In this paper, we will present an independent and systematic evaluation of the current state of private browsing in all mainstream browsers. Our contributions are summarised below.
• Threat model: We refine a threat model for private browsing based on adjusting a previous model (due to Aggarwal et al. [1] ) in order to capture more realistic threats in practice.
• Discovery of new attacks: We have performed a series of concrete experiments and discovered a number of new vulnerabilities across all the web browsers under study.
• Validation of known attacks: We have tested all previously known vulnerabilities against the latest versions of web browsers and are able to confirm that some still remain unfixed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the research methodology used for this study. Section 3 defines a threat model for private browsing. The next two sections, 4 and 5, present a series of experiments to expose vulnerabilities of private browsing against local and remote attackers respectively. Section 6 discusses countermeasures for discovered vulnerabilities. Finally, Section 7 concludes our study and suggests future research.
Research methodology
In this research work, we took a forensic approach to collect and analyse residual data left on the host computer after the private browsing session. Virtualisation was used to prevent any cross-contamination between experiments. In particular, VMware Player (a free version of VMware) was installed [20] . In terms of the operating system, Windows 7 was chosen based on its popularity among the Internet users. For each experiment a fresh Windows installation with a single web browser was used. The experiments were carried out for each browser to investigate possible residual data left in memory or disk after private navigation. A set of freely distributed third party tools were chosen (see Table  1 ), which makes it possible for the reader to replicate the experiments. Finally, all the software tools developed during the course of this research work are released as open source (see [33] ). This should help browser vendors to evaluate the security of their products and improve accordingly.
A group of targeted websites were chosen to imitate a real user's behavior in one browsing session, and to examine a variety of elements involved in web browsing. Table 2 lists the group of targeted websites and their characteristics. In each experiment, the targeted websites were visited in the private 
Threat model
The threat model for private browsing is defined in terms of the attacker's capabilities and their goals. In 2010, Aggarwal et al. defined one threat model for private browsing in [1] . Our model is similar to theirs but with some differences, as we will explain. Same as in [1] , we will categorise attackers into two types: local and remote attackers.
Local attack. A local attacker is someone who has physical access to a user's machine. The threat model defined in [1] restricts the local attack to "after the fact" forensics. In other words, it is assumed that an attacker cannot have physical access to the user's computer before the private browsing session (otherwise, the attacker may just install a key logger and the attack would be trivial). On the other hand, it is acknowledged in [1] that the user may have installed third-party browser extensions before the private session. Our model about a local attacker is essentially the same as that in [1] but with one difference: we explicitly assume at least one of the installed thirdparty extensions were written by an attacker. Hence, instead of surveying the third-party extensions and speculating their behavior as in [1] , we chose to write our own extensions as if from an attacker's perspective. This allows capturing the exact impact of browser extensions more directly.
Remote attack. For remote attacks, we assume the attacker is capable to engage with the user in a web browsing session over HTTP(S). This typically happens when a user navigates to a web site that is controlled by an attacker. The goal of the attacker is to detect whether the user is in the private mode 4 . As compared with the model in [1] , we have excluded the threat of the remote website tracking the user (e.g., based on IP addresses [13] or unique browser fingerprints [4] ). This is because in all browsers, private browsing has never been designed to prevent web tracking (see specifications in [15, 16, 17, 18] ). Hence, it is not reasonable to insist on a privacy feature that the product is not designed for. (We refer interested readers to other privacy-preserving tools such as TOR [29] for the prevention of web tracking.)
Against the defined threat model, we conducted a series of experiments to assess the security of private browsing among the four most popular browsers: Firefox, Chrome, IE and Safari. Table 3 summarises the attacks, and their applicability to specific browsers. Details of each attack will be explained below.
Local attacks

Summary of previously known attacks
Domain Name System (DNS). DNS caching has long been known as a major threat to private browsing [1] . This vulnerability is caused due to the operating system caching the DNS queries sent by a web browser regardless if it is in the private mode or not. The results of our testing on DNS caching have confirmed that, three years after it was reported in [1] , this vulnerability still persists in all browsers. Some third-party extensions have been developed to address this issue [21, 22] , but none of them has been adopted by browser vendors. Memory Inspection. Volatile memory can be a remarkable source of information for forensic investigations. In 2011, Said et al. reported that artifacts from a private browsing session were found left in the primary memory after the exit of the session [14] . We conducted experiments to verify if the same vulnerability still existed in the latest versions of browsers.
WinHex [23] , a popular forensic tool, was used to extract content from RAM. The experimental results revealed that artifacts from private navigation persisted in memory even after the browser was closed. They included information such as visited URLs, password and cookies (see Fig. 1 ).
File timestamp. Timestamps are valuable evidence in any forensic investigation [2] . They often serve to reveal the occurrence of an event at a precise time. In an operating system, each file or folder has a timestamp of the "last modified date". In [1] , Aggarwal et al. compared the "last modified date" for files in the profile directory before and after the private browsing test using Firefox. They found the timestamps had been changed while the sizes of the files remained the same. Based on this observation, the authors suggested that an attacker could deduce the occurrence of a private session in the past. Our experiments showed that the reported vulnerability had been fixed in the latest version of Firefox. However, the same vulnerability was found to exist in Chrome and Safari.
Index.dat
The Index.dat files are binary format log files used by IE to store the user's browsing history, cookies, temporary files, etc. A number of such files are dispersed under different paths in Windows 7, with each recording specific information about the visited web pages.
In order to evaluate the correlation between the private mode (also called InPrivate in IE) and 'Index.dat' files, Index.dat Analyser was installed in order to read and analyse binary format log files [24] . After the navigation of the targeted websites in the private mode, Index.dat Analyser was used to scrutinise residual traces left in the files. Our experiments showed that, unlike in some earlier versions of IE, the latest version successfully removed the traces of private navigation: no history, cookies or cache records were found.
However, we found that adding bookmarks in the IE private mode could lead to information leakage. The browser allows users to freely add bookmarks just as in the usual mode. Bookmarks added during a private session were stored as standalone files under the %USERPROFILE%\Favorites directory with timestamps of the file creation time. On the other hand, there is no Table 4 : Paths of the SQLite database files in different browsers matching URL for the added bookmark in Histoy.IE5\index.dat. A cross comparison between these files could allow an attacker to deduce that the bookmark was added in the private mode; the timestamp of the bookmark file would indicate when the private browsing was used. The attacker may sometimes get false positives as the user may have added a bookmark in the usual mode without visiting the link (e.g., right-click over a hyperlink to add it to the bookmarks). However, the false negatives are always zero.
SQLite Database
SQLite is ANSI-C-based open source database used by Firefox, Chrome and Safari to store historical records of browsing activities [6] . The database is structured as a single file saved under the browser's profile folder. The paths of the SQLite files used by different browsers are summarized in Table  4 .
To study the correlation between the private browsing activities and the underlying SQLite database, we installed SQLite Browser [11] and SQLite Manager [25] to examine the records in detail. Our experiments reveal two vulnerabilities: one is related to the application crash, and the other one related to adding bookmarks.
Application Crash. There are many reasons why a browser program may terminate in an unexpected way. For example, the program may be manually terminated by the user due to unresponsiveness; there may be a sudden power loss; the web page contains too much HTML data to load in the browser; the Javascript or Java plug-in embedded in the web page may be too busy to handle the computational load, etc. The critical question is that: if the program terminates in an unexpected way, will it leave unexpected evidence on disk?
In Firefox, the SQLite database uses Write Ahead Logging (WAL) mode to implement database transactions such as atomic commit and rollback. In this mode, WAL files are created at the first connection to the SQLite database and are deleted when the last connection to the database is closed.
However, in the event of application crash database connections are not closed cleanly and the WAL files will remain on disk until the browser is restarted. We observed that the WAL files left from the private mode always had the zero size (since there were not database updates), while the WAL files left from the usual mode had non-zero size. Hence, based on the size of a WAL file and the timestamp of it, an attacker will be able to deduce that a private session occurred at a specific time. However, restarting the browser in the usual mode will remove this evidence.
Chrome implements the SQLite database transactions using Journal files instead of WAL mode. To speed up the loading, the browser uses two SQLite databases to store the history records: one named "History" and the other in the form of "History Index YYYY-MM" (for example, "History Index 2013-04'' for April of 2013). In the usual mode, the browser uses the two journal files for the two databases respectively. However in the private mode, it just uses one journal file (only for the "History" database). All journal files will remain on disk in the event of application crash or power loss. Based on the existence of only one journal file, an attacker can deduce that a private session occurred and the timestamp of the file reveals when. Similar to Firefox, restarting the browser in the usual mode will remove the evidence.
The case of Safari is more serious. Unlike Firefox and Chrome that only use in-memory SQLite database for private browsing and do not write the visited websites to the database file on disk, Safari actually writes records of the visited websites to the database file and removes them later. Only when the browser is closed normally will those history records be removed. Through experimentation, we found that if the browser was closed in an abnormal way (e.g., a crash or forced termination), the records of visited websites in the private mode would remain in the database. These records will persist on disk even after the browser is restarted. This flaw poses a serious threat to the user's privacy.
Adding Bookmarks. In Firefox, after visiting the targeted websites and adding a bookmark in the private mode, SQLite Manager and SQLite Browser [25] were used to examine the database file named places.sqlite. This database keeps records of all visited URLs and added bookmarks. Within this database, two are particularly relevant: moz places, which stores the visited websites; and moz bookmarks, which stores bookmarks.
Our investigation revealed that a bookmark added during the private mode was recorded in both tables. This was the same as the implementation in the usual mode, except that the "title" and "last visit date" fields were deleted (see Fig. 2 ). A comparison of these two tables would disclose that the bookmark was added during the private mode at a specific time. It is worse than the earlier IE case, since the evidence is definite: i.e., zero false positive and zero false negative. Similarly, in Chrome, the URL for bookmarks added in the private mode could be found in the "history" SQLite database. Contrary to the implementation in the usual mode, the "visit count" field was set to 0 and the "hidden" field set to 1 (see Fig. 3 ). Hence, a search for "visit count=0 and hidden=1" would conveniently disclose websites bookmarked in the private mode with detailed timestamps, which in turn would indicate precisely when private browsing was used.
The case of Safari is the worst. Under the normal operation, Safari removes the browsing history in the private mode when the program is closed. However, we found that as long as the user added one bookmark during the private navigation, all the websites that were visited during the private session would remain in the SQLite database -more specifically, in the PageURL table of the WebpageIcons.db database file. We have reported this bug to Apple, and learned that it would be fixed in a newer version of Safari 5 .
Extensions
The effects of browser extensions on private browsing were studied by Aggarwal et al. in 2010 [1] . Their study was mainly focused on Firefox extensions and the adopted approach was to survey the most popular 40 Firefox extensions and analyse their behavior. We extended their work in two Chrome Extension. Chrome extensions are designed to provide additional functionality and augment default browsing behaviour. Chrome extensions are based on web technologies, with Javascript used for providing functionality, and user interfaces based on HTML and CSS. [27] . For the demonstration purpose, we wrote a Chrome extension, called Incognito Inspector [33] . Once this extension was enabled in the Chrome private mode, it was able to record detailed user activities for the duration of a private browsing session, including when the tabs were opened and closed, which web pages were visited and at which time, how the user flipped between tabs and windows, etc (see Fig. 4 ). These details can be sent to a remote server in real time.
In the latest version of Chrome, extensions are disabled in the private mode by default. This "disable-by-default" policy significantly alleviates the threat. However, the fact that Chrome allows the private and usual modes to run in parallel renders this policy ineffective, as we will explain in Section 4.5.
Safari Extension. To illustrate the risks posed by extensions during private browsing in Safari, we developed a similar inspector extension [33] for Safari, which is able to record details of the user's activities within a Figure 5 shows the Safari extension listing all websites that were visited in the private mode.
Firefox extension. Similarly, an inspector extension [33] was developed for Firefox to record detailed user activities in a private session. As with Safari, the Firefox extensions are enabled in the private mode by default. As shown in Figure 6 , the extension displays all the visited website during the private navigation.
Internet Explorer Unlike other browsers, the development of IE extensions requires using .Net Framework based languages like C#. The extension we developed [33] uses the Browser Helper Object (BHO) class, which provides a rich set of APIs to extend the functionality of IE. In the usual mode, the extension can obtain the URL and the content of the HTML page, which is represented in a DOM (Document Object Model) structure. Like in Chrome, extensions are disabled by default in the private mode. They can be enabled by a manual operation. However, after we manually enabled extensions in the private mode, we found an enabled extension had only restricted privilege: in particular, it could no longer invoke the BHO class. Hence, our attack did not work on IE.
Cross-mode interference
In Chrome, extensions are disabled by default in the private mode. But extensions in the usual mode are enabled. Since Chrome allows the usual and private modes to run in parallel, this provides the attacker an opportunity The attack was motivated by the following observation: the Chrome://memory page displays all the opened tabs in the browser regardless if they are in the usual or private mode (Figure 7 ). Accordingly, we developed an extension using the standard Chrome extension APIs [31], installed it in the browser, and left it disabled in the private mode.
The attack works as follows. In the usual mode, the extension is able to invoke standard APIs to list all tabs, each having a unique ID. If the tab is in the usual mode, the extension can obtain further details about the tab, such as the page title and URL. However, if the tab is in the private mode, no response will be given. But, the precise lack of response provides indication that the queried tab is in the private mode. By periodically polling the tabs, the extension can detect the existence of a private browsing session, the number of active tabs opened in the private mode, when those tabs are opened and when are they closed. Finally, the extension sends all the collected data to a remote website (under our control).
In fact, Chrome also provides experimental APIs (which are enabled in the chrome://flags interface) to further enforce the extension's functionality [32] . In particular, it provides the following additional information about each tab: the CPU consumption, network bandwidth and Frames Per Section (FPS). This information is obtainable even for tabs in the private mode.
The extra information allows the attacker to draw an even more finegrained profile about the user activities within a private session. We do not test the cross-mode interference for Firefox and Safari, because extensions are enabled by default in the private mode for both browsers. Hence, an attacker is better off to steal sensitive information about private browsing directly through the extension rather than by exploiting the crossmode interference.
Remote attacks
Based on the threat model explained in Section 3, the fact that a person used or is using the private mode is considered a privacy feature by itself. However, existing implementations of private browsing in several browsers allow a remote website to easily tell if the user is using the private mode. In this section, we will explain two attacks, based on checking the color of hyperlinks and the side-channel timing information of writing cookies. 
Hyperlink attack
Normally a web browser displays an unvisited hyperlink in blue and changes it to purple after the user clicks the link or visits the URL. This is a conventional technique adopted by all browsers to distinguish visited links from unvisited ones, hence improving the user's browsing experience [3] .
However, there are noticeable deviations for the same mechanism to work in the private mode. As we have tested, all browsers started a new private session with all hyperlinks displayed in blue. In several browsers (Chrome, Firefox and Safari), the hyperlink never changes colour even after the user has clicked the link or visited the URL. (One might argue that this has the benefit of making it more difficult for the remote website to track the visited pages than in the usual mode since the color of the hyperlink does not change much; however, it is worth noting that defence against web tracking is not within the threat model of private browsing.)
These deviations clearly degrade the user experience; furthermore, they create an exploit path for a remote attacker. Based on the difference in the hyperlink colours, the remote attacker is able to tell a private mode apart from a usual mode. As a result, the user may be presented with different web pages and advertisements (that may contain more adult content). For example, since in Chrome, Firefox and Safari, the hyperlinks are persistently blue in the private mode, a remote website can use JavaScript to check the colour of the hyperlinks and easily tell if the user is currently in the private mode. This vulnerability was first reported in [1] and we find it still exists in the latest versions of the browsers. However, the case of IE is a bit different. In the latest version of IE, the colour of the hyperlink does change based on the user's clicking just like in the usual mode. However, the private mode still deviates from the usual mode in that the former always displays all hyperlinks in blue in the beginning of the session. Hence, if the remote attacker is able to regularly engage with the user in more than one sessions (e.g., the remote attacker controls a news website), he can easily tell if the user is in the private mode.
Timing attack
Timing attacks used to compromise the privacy of Internet users are presented in the literature [5] . In this section, we describe a novel client-side timing attack based on leveraging differences in time taken to write a large number of cookies between usual and private modes.
Implementation. We developed a simple PHP and MySQL application to measure the time taken to write a predefined number of cookies, and then store these results to a database for further analysis. The Selenium testing framework [30] was used to automate testing enabling large-scale experimentation.
Evaluation. We collected extensive timing measurements for the usual and private modes (100 samples per mode per browser) as training data (see Figure 9 ). Normal distributions are fitted to each training set. The evaluation is based on using a standard z -test [7] , as defined in Equation 1, where x is the sample mean, µ is the hypothesised mean, σ is the population standard deviation 6 , and n is the sample size.
We calculate p-values representing the probability that a given observation belongs to usual or private browsing mode, as follows.
We then employ a simple threshold policy where any sample s from browser b whose p-value for private mode is greater than its p-value for usual mode by a threshold interval t is categorised as belonging to private mode. Our approach is outlined in Equation 3 , where b usual and b private are training sets for browser b in usual and private modes respectively.
We collected further 100 timing measurements for each browser for each mode in order to evaluate the effectivenss of our approach. There are two types of errors in the evaluation. One is the False Acceptance Rate (FAR), that is the rate of a usual browsing session being characterised as private. The other is False Rejection Rate (FRR), that is the rate of a private browsing session being characterised as in the usual mode. The two error rates vary according to the threshold. Hence, in the evaluation, we used the Equal Error Rate (EER) where the FRR and FAR curves intersect. In the ideal case, the EER should be close to 50%: i.e., the attacker detects the private/usual mode no better than tossing a coin. However, as shown in Table 5 : Equal Error Rates for detecting the browsing mode. The level of insecurity is expressed as |0.5 − EER|: the bigger the value is, the less secure.
Discussion on countermeasures
We divide the causes of attacks into two categories: internal elements that only concern the internal design of a browser, and external elements that involve external interactions with the rest of the system.
Internal elements
Adding bookmarks. Our research shows that adding bookmarks in the private mode can cause privacy violation in all major browsers with a varying degree of severity. One countermeasure may be to disallow adding any bookmarks in the private mode (as implemented in an earlier version of Chrome 20.0). However, this would cause inconvenience to users; there exist valid use cases in which a user may want to add a bookmark while in the private mode. In the existing implementation of private browsing in all major browsers, users are completely uninformed about the potential information leakage associated with adding bookmarks in the private mode. Hence, browser vendors should at least add a mechanism to inform the user about the potential privacy violation before a bookmark is added, e.g., through the display of a warning dialogue.
SQLite database. We find SQLite temporary files usually remain on disk in the event of the program crash or power off. In Chrome and Firefox, the traces left on disk allow an attacker to deduce the occurrence of private browsing in the past. In Safari, the traces reveal the websites that were visited in the private session. The browser crash is an edge case as it happens infrequently in the normal usage. However, for a secure implementation, all edge cases should be considered. For example, the obvious flaw of the Safari browser retaining private navigation history in the event of program crash should have been easily detected in the in-house testing if Apple developers had included all edge cases into the test framework.
Extension. We have shown that browser extensions can easily reveal the user's activities in the private mode. So far only Chrome and IE disable extension by default in the private mode. We recommend other browsers to do the same. Furthermore, when an extension is enabled in the private mode, the browser should treat it differently as running in the usual mode, and restrict its privileged access to extension APIs accordingly. Recently, researchers have made progress in developing an automated tool to verify the extensions' compliance with the private browsing mode [8] . Such tool can prove useful if it is integrated into the web browser, so that only the compliant extensions can be installed.
Cross-mode interference. Chrome allows the usual and private modes to run in parallel. However, our research shows that an attacker is able to obtain user-sensitive information in the private mode by exploiting crossmode interference. A safer approach is to run the browser in a single mode only.
Hyperlinks. Our research shows that for all browsers, a remote attacker can easily tell if a user is in the private mode by checking the hyperlink colours. This is because the way a hyperlink is coloured in the private mode deviates from that in the usual mode. Such deviations clearly degrade the user experience in the private navigation mode. Furthermore, they do not seem to provide any real advantage in making private browsing more secure. On the contrary, based on such deviations, a remote attacker is able to easily tell a private mode apart from a usual mode. We therefore recommend browser vendors to remove these deviations. The mechanism for displaying hyperlinks should be same in the private mode as in the usual mode. The only difference should be that in the private mode the information about visited websites is not persistently saved on disk once the session is closed.
Cookie timing. For several browsers, we observed a noticeable difference in the time spent to write cookies between the usual and private modes. This difference can be exploited by a remote attacker to tell if the user is in the private mode. Usually, to mitigate the effects of timing attacks, one commonly adopted countermeasure is to insert random delays to reduce the timing difference (e.g, see [9, 10] ). The same countermeasure may be applied here, but we believe it is important to first understand why such differences exist. Unfortunately, with our current state of knowledge, we cannot fully explain what caused the timing differences. (One may say writing cookies should be quicker in the private mode as it is a memory-only operation and no data is written to the disk. However, that intuitive explanation does not seem to apply to Chrome.) More investigation in this aspect is needed.
External elements
DNS. DNS cache retains the websites visited regardless if they are from the usual or private mode. Some researchers have already made progress in developing extensions to clean the DNS cache [21, 22] . It should be possible for browser vendors to integrate such solutions into the browser, so that records in the DNS cache related to the private browsing can be sanitised in an automated manner.
Memory. We have found artifacts in memory left from the private navigation for all browsers under test. It seems browser vendors have all failed to address this vulnerability, despite that it was reported in 2011 [14] . Cleaning all individual data from RAM is a computationally expensive procedure, which may explain a lack of progress in this area. We are unable to suggest any solution at this stage; more research is needed in this area.
File timestamps. In the latest versions of Firefox and IE, we did not observe any timestamp change of files under the profile directory after a private browsing session. Both browsers chose to read databases into memory and do not write any new record to the file on the disk. This is a more secure approach, which we recommend other browsers to follow.
Conclusion
We have presented a range of vulnerabilities in the existing implementations of private browsing across four popular web browsers. The revealed problems highlight the complexity of the subject and call for more attention from the security community. They also show that ad-hoc efforts to implement private browsing -as currently adopted by browser vendors -can easily lead to important security considerations being ignored. A more systematic approach to design, implement and test the private browsing feature is needed -in particular, an appropriate threat model should be established so to provide a yardstick to measure security; edge cases that happen infrequently (e.g., application crash, user adding bookmarks) should be included in the test framework; extensions should be disabled in the private mode by default (otherwise, there must be some automated tool, like the one developed in [8] , to strictly ensure the extensions' compliance with the private model); the browser should be run in a single mode to avoid any cross-mode interference; deviations between the private and usual modes should be minimized as much as possible so that a remote attacker cannot reliably tell the two modes apart.
